Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement
124 th General Assembly of Ohio
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STATE FUND |
FY 2003 |
FY 2004 |
FUTURE YEARS |
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|
General Revenue Fund |
||||||
|
Revenues |
- 0 - |
- 0 - |
||||
|
Expenditures |
Increase, minimal at most |
Increase, minimal at most |
Increase, minimal at most |
|||
|
Offender Financial
Responsibility Fund (Fund 5H8) |
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|
Revenues |
Potential gain, likely to
be sporadic |
Potential gain, likely to
be sporadic |
Potential gain, likely to
be sporadic |
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|
Expenditures |
- 0 - |
- 0 - |
- 0 - |
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Note: The state fiscal year is July 1 through June 30. For
example, FY 2003 is July 1, 2002 – June 30, 2003.
·
Medical Services Program Costs. The bill makes several changes to the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s (DRC) medical services program,
some of which carry very little in the way of ongoing fiscal burdens, as they
largely comport with the department’s current practices or reflect directions
in which it is already headed. The provisions requiring DRC: (1) to conduct a
study on the feasibility and desirability of purchasing insurance to protect
against unpredictable or catastrophic losses, and (2) to take actions that may
ultimately lead to the implementation of an external utilization review program
will, however, create some costs for which DRC had not planned. At this time,
DRC does not expect those additional costs, which presumably would be borne by
its General Revenue Fund (GRF) budget, to be significant.
·
Fund 5H8 Revenues. DRC’s existing Offender Financial Responsibility
Fund (Fund 5H8) may experience a gain in annual revenue as a result of
collecting the cost of medical care from an offender or a third-party payer.
That revenue is likely to be sporadic or intermittent, and the amounts that
might be gained are highly uncertain and difficult to predict. An extremely
large percentage of the offender population is indigent and very few are likely
to be carrying health insurance coverage.
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LOCAL
GOVERNMENT |
FY 2002 |
FY 2003 |
FUTURE YEARS |
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Counties and
Municipalities |
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|
Revenues |
Potential gain, not likely
to exceed minimal in most jurisdictions |
Potential gain, not likely
to exceed minimal in most jurisdictions |
Potential gain, not likely
to exceed minimal in most jurisdictions |
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|
Expenditures |
Minimal effect |
Minimal effect |
Minimal effect |
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Note: For most local governments, the fiscal year is the calendar year. The school district fiscal year is July 1 through June 30.
·
Confinement Costs Reimbursement. The bill essentially
consolidates “pay-for-stay” mechanisms and revises some of the provisions
containing those procedures. As a result, local governments could collect more
confinement cost reimbursement revenues from offenders than might otherwise
have been the case under current law. The magnitude of that potential revenue
gain in any given local jurisdiction is not easily quantifiable, and is likely
to be a function of at least two factors: (1) the aggressiveness of the local
jurisdiction in imposing and then pursuing the collection of confinement costs,
and (2) the financial circumstances of the offenders who have been assessed
confinement costs. Recognizing those unknowns, generally speaking, it seems
unlikely that most local jurisdictions would realize more than a minimal gain
in annual confinement cost reimbursement revenues. In addition, if, as a result
of the bill, a local jurisdiction decides to pursue more confinement cost
reimbursements from more offenders, then, even if more revenues are actually
collected, the costs of collecting those additional revenues would likely
increase as well.
·
Daily Fine Credits. The bill increases from $30 to $50 the credit that
is given an offender jailed for failure to pay a fine. The practical effect of
this provision is to potentially reduce the length of jail stays for offenders
who are so jailed in the future from the length of jail stays that those
offenders might otherwise have served under current law. If the length of jail
stays is reduced, then local detention facilities turn their jail beds over more
quickly, and if those “turned” beds are not immediately reoccupied, then those
local detention facilities presumably realize some savings. Although the
magnitude of those potential savings for local detention facilities is not
readily quantifiable, it appears that any potential savings for a given local
detention facility is unlikely to exceed minimal, especially in light of the
fact that, generally speaking, there are more jail-bound offenders than there
are jail beds in Ohio.
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The bill contains the following five provisions that will or could affect the annual revenues and expenditures of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC):
(1)
Permits
DRC to charge offenders for the cost of any medical care.
(2)
Permits
DRC to determine whether an offender is covered under a health insurance or
health care policy, contract, or plan, and permits DRC or the health care
services provider to promptly submit a claim to the appropriate third-party
payer for payment for health services provided to the offender.
(3)
Requires
DRC to establish a schedule of health care benefits that are available to
offenders, and to establish a program to encourage the utilization of
preventive health care services by offenders.
(4)
Requires
DRC to develop specifications and request proposals for an external utilization
review organization to evaluate the clinical necessity, appropriateness,
efficacy, or efficiency of any outside health care service recommended for an
offender, to report the responses to the request for proposals to certain
parties within six months after the bill’s effective date, but does not require
DRC to enter into a contract with an external utilization review organization
unless its budget can adequately fund the provision of such a service.
(5)
Requires
DRC to study and report within six months after the bill’s effective date on
the feasibility and desirability of purchasing insurance coverage to protect
against unpredictable or catastrophic offender health care service costs.
From the
perspective of local governments, most likely counties and municipalities, the
bill contains the following provisions that could affect the revenues and
expenditures of the state’s political subdivisions:
(1)
Modifies
the procedures by which costs related to a prisoner’s confinement in a local
detention facility are collected.
(2)
Permits
reimbursement for the costs of confinement to include a one-time reception fee
for the costs of processing the prisoner into the facility at the time of the
prisoner’s initial entry into the facility.
(3)
Increases
from $30 to $50 the daily fine credit given to an offender jailed for failure
to pay a fine.
State fiscal effects
Medical care charges
The bill explicitly allows
DRC to charge offenders for the cost of their medical care. Currently, DRC
charges offenders a $3 copay for any voluntary health care services visit. This
copay is deposited in the state treasury to the credit of DRC’s existing
Offender Financial Responsibility Fund (Fund 5H8). It is unlikely, however,
that DRC would be able to charge many offenders the full cost of their medical
care, particularly for chronic illnesses, because so many of those offenders
are indigent. Any payments for medical care obtained from offenders as a result
of this provision of the bill would also be deposited in the state treasury to
the credit of the Offender Financial Responsibility Fund. In addition, existing
law that creates the Offender Financial Responsibility Fund and specifies the
uses of its revenues is permissive and broad enough that DRC could most likely
attempt to collect for medical care costs now if it chose to do so.
Third-party payers
The bill permits DRC to
determine if an offender has health insurance that would cover medical services
being provided and then permits after such a determination for DRC or the
provider of health care services to the offender to promptly file a claim with
the appropriate third-party payer. Discussions with DRC indicate that little
additional revenue or expenditure savings will be realized through this
provision of the bill, as few offenders have health insurance coverage.
Additionally, in the long run it may be more costly or difficult for DRC to
adhere to the requirements of a health insurance company in order to receive
reimbursement from an offender’s health insurance. For example, if the
offender’s preferred care provider is hours away from the offender’s
institution, DRC may be unable to utilize the medical coverage available. While
the bill allows DRC to have health care services rendered to an offender at a
site approved by the department, it is unclear how cooperative health care
insurers will be in facilitating this process.
The bill also gives DRC the
right of subrogation with regard to the payments from health insurance
companies. This is to ensure that DRC receives such payments instead of the
offender or a family member.
Because it is unlikely that
many offenders have health insurance, this task is not likely to create an
expensive administrative burden for DRC. Any reimbursements collected from
third-party payers would also be deposited in the state treasury to the credit
of the Offender Financial Responsibility Fund. The amount of additional annual
revenue that might be generated is uncertain and likely to be sporadic.
Health care services rules
The bill requires DRC to
adopt rules to establish a schedule of health care services benefits available
to offenders, and to establish a program to encourage the utilization of
preventive health care services by offenders. As these health care services
rule adoption and program requirements largely comport with the department’s
current practices or reflect directions in which its medical services program
was already headed, their implementation will not be problematic or costly.
Catastrophic coverage
The bill requires DRC to
examine and report on the feasibility and desirability of purchasing insurance
coverage to protect against unpredictable or catastrophic health care losses.
At this time, DRC believes it has sufficient staff and related resources to
undertake this required study in-house.
External utilization review
organization
The bill requires that DRC
request proposals (based on specifications that the department will develop)
for a utilization review program. The organization selected to perform these
utilization reviews would be responsible for examining the clinical necessity,
appropriateness, efficacy, or efficiency of any outside health care service
recommended for an offender. The department is not then required to enter into
a contract with an external utilization review organization to provide such a
service unless it has an adequate amount of money to do so.
DRC is currently working on
establishing just such a utilization review program for in-house medical care,
but the utilization reviews would be conducted in-house. Although such reviews
conducted by an external utilization review organization for a recommended
outside health care service would create an additional ongoing annual cost for
DRC, it is not expected to be significant (less than $100,000 per fiscal year).
Local fiscal effects
Confinement cost
reimbursement
Local
governments are permitted to use the following types of reimbursement
(“pay-for-stay”) mechanisms for the purpose of recovering the costs of an offender’s
confinement in a local detention facility: (1) reimbursement ordered by a court
as part of a sentence, (2) reimbursement required pursuant to a specified
standard procedure by the governmental entity that operates the local detention
facility, (3) reimbursement pursuant to a policy “in lieu of” the standard
procedure, and (4) reimbursement pursuant to a medical fee reimbursement
mechanism. The bill essentially consolidates those “pay-for-stay” mechanisms
and revises some of the provisions contained in those procedures.
From a fiscal perspective,
those statutory changes most notably: (1) appear to make it easier for local
governments to collect reimbursement for the costs of confinement if those
local governments choose to do so, and (2) permit a local governmental entity
to charge an offender a one-time reception fee for the costs of processing the
offender into a local detention facility. As a result, local governments could
collect more confinement cost reimbursement revenues from offenders than might
otherwise have been the case under current law. The magnitude of that potential
revenue gain in any given local jurisdiction is not easily quantifiable, and is
likely to be a function of at least two factors: (1) the aggressiveness of the
local jurisdiction in imposing and then pursuing the collection of confinement
costs, and (2) the financial circumstances of the offenders who have been
assessed confinement costs. Recognizing those unknowns, generally speaking, it
seems unlikely that most local jurisdictions would realize more than a minimal
gain in annual confinement cost reimbursement revenues. In addition, if, as a
result of the bill, a local jurisdiction decides to pursue more confinement
cost reimbursements from more offenders, then, even if more revenues are
actually collected, the costs of collecting those additional revenues would
likely increase as well.
Daily
fine credits
The bill increases from $30
to $50 the credit that is given an offender jailed for failure to pay a fine.
The practical effect of this provision is to potentially reduce the length of
jail stays for offenders who are so jailed in the future from the length of
jail stays that those offenders might otherwise have served under current law.
If the length of jail stays is reduced, then local detention facilities turn
their jail beds over more quickly, and if those “turned” beds are not
immediately reoccupied, then those local detention facilities presumably
realize some savings. Although the magnitude of those potential savings for
local detention facilities is not readily quantifiable, it appears that any
potential savings for a given local detention facility is unlikely to exceed
minimal, especially in light of the fact that, generally speaking, there are
more jail-bound offenders than there are jail beds in Ohio.
LSC fiscal staff: Laura A. Potts, Budget Analyst